Ripensare il nostro approccio alla Scienza
Ricerca scientifica e riforma degli atenei: qual è il confine tra "autonomia" e "autoreferenzialità"?
La scienza come "circuito integrato"
di Giorgio Israel
Copyright - Il Foglio Quotidiano, Anno VIII, n. 262, III
Al direttore - Lei ha giustamente stigmatizzato sia l’atteggiamento degli industriali che "danno buoni consigli e non quattrini" sia l’autoreferenzialità spesso inefficiente dell’Università. Forse sarebbe bene andare più al fondo della questione e chiedersi se quei consigli siano davvero buoni e quale sia il confine fra autonomia e autoreferenzialità.
Partiamo da un riferimento. Due aspetti, entrambi da noi mancanti, hanno reso tanto efficace e vincente il modello statunitense della ricerca scientifica.
In primo luogo, la visione della scienza come un gigantesco circuito integrato, di cui nessuna singola parte funziona ed è vitale senza che funzionino e siano vitali tutte. L’efficacia del sistema dipende dal fatto che ne venga favorito lo sviluppo in ogni sua parte. Poco importa se certe parti non appaiono di utilità immediata. Esse possono certamente contribuire allo sviluppo dei settori della ricerca contigui e di qui, per successivi rapporti di interazione, anche allo sviluppo di settori più o meno direttamente applicativi, e quindi al sistema nel suo insieme. Pertanto, il sistema complessivo è efficiente se non è soggetto a limitazioni in alcuna delle sue parti e se non soffre di disequilibri. In altri termini, se è completamente libero di svilupparsi secondo i suoi criteri interni, ovvero secondo i criteri di libertà che gli sono propri.
Ricordo ancora il mio stupore quando, nel preparare la mia tesi su un argomento di matematica astrattissimo e inapplicabile, utilizzavo manuali finanziati dalla Marina o dall’Aviazione USA – qualcosa che in Italia non si è mai vista. Anzi, qui si predica sempre di più che bisogna finanziare solo ciò che si dimostra subito "produttivo", e c’è persino qualche buontempone che dice che la distinzione fra scienza pura e applicata è "superata". Qui ci si riempe la bocca della parola "liberale", ignorando che l’essenza di un atteggiamento liberale consiste nel creare le condizioni per un "libero" sviluppo di ogni parte della ricerca; e non ci si rende conto che l’idea "produttivistica" risponde a un approccio dirigistico – roba da scienza socialmente utile di sovietica memoria. Ancor meno ci si rende conto del fatto che la produttività, nel campo scientifico e culturale, spesso si ottiene proprio andando in senso opposto alla produttività immediata! Un esempio. Oggi viviamo nell’era informatica proprio grazie alla scienza "pura". Lo scienziato che progettò il primo calcolatore digitale, von Neumann, lo fece proponendo di non occuparsi per qualche tempo degli aspetti direttamente tecnologici e materiali delle macchine di calcolo, per affrontare in primo luogo il problema teorico in tutta la sua astrattezza. Il calcolatore digitale è figlio delle ricerche di logica e dei modelli matematici astratti del sistema neuronale e non del bricolage di realizzazioni precedenti, il quale ci avrebbe lasciato all’era delle calcolatrici elettromeccaniche. Occorrerebbe piuttosto osservare che la rarefazione di nuove grandi innovazioni tecnologiche è proprio dovuta alla caduta di attenzioni per la scienza pura…
Queste cose sono lontane mille miglia dalla mente dei nostri industriali e dei nostri manager. Pertanto, se costoro non staccano assegni non è tanto perché siano avari, ma perché hanno idee sbagliate. Di conseguenza, anche i loro consigli non sono buoni, bensì pessimi.
E veniamo qui alla seconda grande differenza con gli Stati Uniti, dove esiste una classe imprenditoriale vivace e fantasiosa che, persino ai livelli medio-piccoli, si interessa della ricerca, invia propri esperti ad ascoltare seminari nelle Università, anche i più astrusi e apparentemente inutili, coltiva la speranza "folle" di scoprire in tal modo idee per realizzare nuovi prodotti avveniristici che cambieranno il volto della produzione e spiazzeranno i competitori. Un simile atteggiamento è quello che fa davvero avanzare ricerca e tecnologia. Si è mai visto qualche esperto di un’industria italiana frequentare un seminario universitario? Si dice che la grande industria italiana (la Fiat in particolare) non abbia finanziato mai nulla, o quasi nulla. Di certo, le industrie che più fanno commesse alle Università sono piccole o piccolissime imprese che vogliono ottimizzare la produzione di cardini o piastrelle e che richiedono un’analisi capace di ottenere questo risultato, ma, date le loro dimensioni, dispongono di pochi mezzi e di tempi ristretti. A fronte dell’insistenza con cui oggi si chiede all’Università di essere direttamente produttiva, molti accettano questo tipo di finanziamento se non altro per soppravvivere. Ma il rapporto che così si istituisce fra impresa e industria è esattamente inverso a quello statunitense. Oggi, la ricerca e l’Università sono nella tenaglia di una classe imprenditoriale miope e di una classe politica e amministrativa che sta progressivamente incorporando visioni ristrettamente manageriali. Queste visioni, oltre ad essere di corte vedute, sono, in definitiva, causa di inefficienza e di distruzione delle conoscenze e delle competenze.
Probabilmente a causa della crisi economica seguita agli anni ottanta, dell’enorme debito pubblico e così via, è cresciuta in Italia una classe di manager che conosce un solo strumento: le "forbici". La filosofia delle forbici dilaga e ci sentiamo persino dire che è inutile comprare libri per le biblioteche, tanto c’è Internet. (Non ci dovrebbe essere bisogno di commentare, ma purtroppo non ne sono sicuro). Si da il caso che, nel campo culturale e scientifico, le forbici siano lo strumento più stupido e distruttivo che esista. Cultura e scienza sono imprese improduttive e in perdita nell’immediato, e la cui produttività si misura sul medio-lungo periodo, e che spesso sono produttive proprio nella misura in cui non lo sono sull’immediato. Occorre avere quindi il coraggio di dire – abbandonando tartufismi e ipocrisie – che, in questo campo, qualche bilancio in rosso è normale, anzi indispensabile per non determinare in futuro certi ed enormi disavanzi.
Sono sotto gli occhi di tutti gli effetti sull’Università dell’uso di un insulso parametro di produttività immediata: la percentuale degli studenti che si laureano nei tempi previsti e quella degli studenti che abbandonano l’Università. Poniamoci questa domanda: se le Università vengono minacciate di un taglio dei fondi nel caso in cui questi parametri non migliorino, quale sarà la risposta più "naturale"? Non ci vuole molta fantasia a immaginarla. Basterà abbassare il livello dei corsi e promuovere con maggiore generosità. Difatti, a livello governativo, si è vantato un miglioramento su questo fronte: più studenti si laureano e meno abbandonano… Contenti loro… Cascano le braccia: nessuno si chiede se questa irresponsabile politica di minacce monetarie non stia facendo a pezzi la qualità degli studi universitari spingendo al degrado, unica via per salvare i quattro soldi necessari alla sussistenza.
Veniamo ora alla questione dell’autoreferenzialità e della valutazione del sistema universitario. Qui bisogna distinguere. Vi sono casi clamorosi per i quali non occorre una competenza speciale per giudicare, come la proliferazione di corsi di laurea manifestamente ripetitivi, frazionati e specializzati all’eccesso, e persino ridicoli nelle denominazioni. Ma, al di là di queste situazioni più evidenti, anche qui bisogna avere il coraggio di ribadire ai Tartufi un concetto chiaro: l’università è un sistema che, per sua natura, non può che vivere su un sistema di autocontrollo e il cui reclutamente è basato su procedimenti di cooptazione. Sarebbe folle non vedere come sia esistito ed esista un elevato grado di immoralità e di mancanza di rispetto del merito scientifico nelle procedure di cooptazione, e che spesso il sistema di autovalutazione si riduce alle pratiche estreme di giudicare bene tutti o di spezzare le gambe a qualche collega inviso. Non si vede, peraltro, perché mai il sistema universitario dovrebbe essere migliore di altri settori di una società in cui troppo e a tutti i livelli è diffuso il culto dell’illegalità, del favoritismo e della collusione mafiosa. È però evidente che il prevalere di atteggiamenti eticamente corretti non può essere soltanto risolto in termini normativi. Sfido chiunque a inventare un sistema concorsuale che metta al riparo da ingiustizie nel reclutamento universitario. A meno che… a meno che tale reclutamento non venga affidato alla magistratura, ai funzionari ministeriali o alla politica. Ma se un giudizio di merito deve esservi su questioni su cui i soggetti competenti sono per definizione gli universitari, è inevitabile che ad essi soltanto spetti la decisione.
Analogo è il discorso per quanto riguarda la valutazione dei risultati della ricerca. Chi dovrà farla se non il sistema medesimo? Oppure si pensa di affidarla a commissioni di funzionari ministeriali, di industriali e di manager, ovvero a strutture di tipo sovietico? Sappiamo bene qual è la risposta: occorre conseguire il giudizio sulla base di criteri "scientifici oggettivi" espressi nell’ambito di un’istituzione centrale di valutazione. Benissimo, a condizione che il processo di valutazione sia elaborato dalla comunità nel suo complesso, e si riferisca ai contenuti e alla qualità e non a parametri quantitativi o statistici di dubbio valore, per giunta stabiliti da una casta di specialisti della valutazione. Difatti, la "scienza della valutazione" – ammesso che meriti il nome di scienza, e chi scrive ne dubita fortemente – è un sapere come gli altri e a cui non può essere riconosciuto lo status di "superconoscenza" al disopra delle altre e che tutte le altre valuta. Anche i valutatori debbono essere valutati… E, a giudicare dalla qualità miserrima delle procedure di rilevamento delle opinioni degli studenti – le famose "schede di valutazione" – essi non meritano per ora un giudizio indulgente.
Appare quindi convincente ed equilibrato il documento dei docenti nominati dalla conferenza dei Rettori quando critica gli abusi compiuti in nome dell’autonomia, ma ne difende il principio; quando auspica un sistema di valutazione fondato sull’analisi delle condizioni strutturali e della qualità dell’insegnamento, un sistema di autovalutazione che premi la qualità della ricerca in termini di effetti della concorrenza fra atenei, preservando il carattere pubblico del sistema; e propugna "un’idea alta e coerente di università". Sembra retorica ma non è. Perché, a me pare che un’idea "alta" significhi un’idea "culturale" e non miseramente gestionale. Dagli ideali, soprattutto da quelli "alti", nascono non soltanto l’efficienza ma anche i comportamenti eticamente corretti, che non possono essere imposti dalle forbici dei manager e dalle schede dei valutatori di professione, i quali sono i primi imbrogliati dall’inefficacia dei loro sistemi – il che non sarebbe un male, se questa inefficacia non fosse la via per determinare il tracollo di tutto il sistema.
ECSITE (European Collaborative for Science, Industry and Technology)
Annual Conference 2002 - London, 14-16 NovemberSession A – Science & Society
by Giorgio Israel
When I was writing my degree thesis in a very abstract field of mathematics, I used a book that, as was printed on the title page, had been sponsored by the Office of Ordnance Research of United States Army and by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. I found this particularly surprising as it was hard to believe that the "complete ideals in regular local rings of dimension 2" could have any practical, let alone, military application.
And yet this reflected a view of science that was both extraordinarily effective and today extraordinarily obsolete. It was viewed as a gigantic integrated circuit, in which no part could function unless all the others did, and which was efficient only when absolutely free to develop in obedience to its internal criteria. This circuit was viewed as a complete "pure science - applied science" system, that is, as "science-technology".
A word of caution. This freedom has nothing to do with that preached by economic neoliberism, that expressed by the "invisible hand" metaphor, so to speak. Indeed, the science-technology system presents a paradox, in that its several parts are not all equally "robust" from the social point of view. Pure science may well enjoy high social prestige - although increasingly less so today - but it does not benefit from the same self-seeking interest as do technological applications. Therefore, in order to guarantee the system's freedom it is necessary to protect its weaker parts. Pure or basic science is indeed one of these. Of course, this kind of outlook is meaningful only if it is acknowledged that the principle that guarantees scientific research's full freedom to develop is a social duty, and that science must be included among the sectors deemed to be of public interest, just like social welfare and health care.
If, on the contrary, all forms of protective regulation are eliminated the system will inevitably become unbalanced. It should be emphasized that this regulation entails the protection of science from any attempt to "influence" it, however paradoxical this may seem. It is the opposite of the ideological regulation typical of totalitarian systems. In the European fascist regimes action was taken to lay down rigid boundaries between the pure and the applied sectors (mainly in favour of the latter). In the soviet communist system the aim was actually to determine to which sectors of pure science priority was to be given and which were not to be developed: indeed, relativity and quantum mechanics were considered as "bourgeois science", to be opposed.
It should be noted that the elimination of all forms of protection - corresponding to an ongoing process of privatization of scientific and technological research or the introduction of private sector and management criteria into the public sector – leads to results that are not very different. For example, it can lead to the decline of pure science with respect to applied science. Is this not precisely what we are witnessing today? If research is privatized, it gradually moves out of the sphere of the sectors of public interest and that are socially protected. The idea of "socially useful" is replaced by that of "economically useful" or of "immediate return". Nowadays entire basic research sectors are withering away because they are not considered to be immediately useful. Entire groups of scientists and researchers are moving away from pure science (which is increasingly starved of funds, at least in relative terms) towards the greener fields of applied research. One typical case is mathematics; numerous top flight mathematicians are abandoning geometric or analytical research for computer science and digital research. In the 'seventies, the eminent biologist François Jacob wrote: "We no longer study life in our laboratories", thereby suggesting that an ideal of knowledge had been replaced by purely manipulative practices. What appeared at the time as a worried warning is today simply an obvious fact. Quite apart from appearances, an impatience with pure science is emerging that is reminiscent of the words of John Hammond, the creator of Jurassic Park in Michael Crichton's novel: "Scientists want to do research. That’s all they ever want to do, research. Not to accomplish anything. Not to make any progress. Just do research."
And yet it should be quite obvious that the idea of immediate return and obvious effectiveness is not only unintelligent. It is also destructive.
The greatest technological breakthroughs of the 20th century would have been impossible without the driving force provided by pure science. Let us take the case of computers. The constant upgrading of calculating machines using 'bricolage' methods would never have led to the digital era. It was rather the Copernican revolution by John von Neumann that suggested, at least initially, setting aside research on the technical components of the machine, and starting instead from an abstract model (McCulloch and Pitts' mathematical model) that was representative of a series of functional aspects of the human brain. The EDVAC report was the starting point for the modern computer revolution precisely because it proposed this point of view, which proved the most effective from the technological standpoint. But one may wonder whether any further comparable conceptual revolutions have been encountered or whether we have instead entered the potentially sterile era of "bricolage".
Another example selected at random is that of the biologist Henri Atlan who pointed out that the success of cloning techniques represents a radical refutation of the "genetics is everything" paradigm. And yet - in confirmation of the lack of interest surrounding conceptual scientific speculation - no mention is made of this. On the contrary, a detrimental form of popularizing, often encouraged by a number of scientists, inundates us daily with the image of man as a "genetic machine". And so one day we discover the gene of jealously or marital infedelity, and the next that of fear. Often at the risk of appearing ridiculous and absurd, with the future prospect of everyone being "cured" of fear. As though it would be a good idea to unleash millions of motorists that felt no fear…
Clearly, technological pressure mingled with utopian expectations casts a cloud over scientific seriousness and radically modifies the characteristics of science as we have known it for the past few centuries.
However, here we are touching upon a central problem that clashes with the need for the "freedom" of science of which von Neumann was well aware when he pointed out that "it is for the first time that science has produced results which require an immediate intervention of organized society… it is for the first time that a vast area of research, right in the central part of the physical sciences, impinges on a broad front on the vital zone of society, and clearly requires rapid and general regulation. It is now that physical science has become ‘important’ in that painful and dangerous sense which causes the state to intervene. Regulation is needed, because nuclear physics, in combination with irresponsible or clumsy politics, could at this very moment inflict terrible wounds on society". And he added that "present awful possibilities of nuclear warfare may give way to others even more awful. After global climate control becomes possible, perhaps all our present involvements will seem simple."
In actual fact, von Neumann believed so strongly in the principle that the science-technology system should be indivisible and that any form of control applied to it could be detrimental that he was unable to resolve the above contradiction. And indeed he ended up taking a pragmatic stance "the most hopeful answer is that the human species has been subjected to similar tests before and seems to have a congenital ability to come through, after varying amounts of trouble".
Nowadays we feel that it is no longer possible to make do with such answers and that the problem of the control over technological output can no longer be ducked, despite its enormous complexity. The complexity is so great that I feel it would not be justified to try and give a definite answer in such a short report. However, several points must be firmly established. It is hard to accept the superficial hypothesis that science and technology cannot be dangerous but only beneficial. An increasingly clear-cut demand is emerging to exert control over the effects of technology on everyday life, particularly when it affects the ethical sphere.
Regarding the latter point, it is necessary to clear the decks of a misunderstanding. The ethical sphere does not belong to the domain of science. The claim that ethical problems can be solved using the methods of exact science - perhaps mathematical logic, and perhaps even according to utilitarian principles - is an indemonstrable assertion that pertains more to the sphere of ideology than to that of science. And this is an ideology based on a rough and ready, as well as brutal, scientism, in actual fact, a form of materialism that certainly has no greater dignity than the spiritualist conceptions that it would like to see banned as anti-scientific. In actual fact, if we observe the results that this scientism has produced in the ethical and social field, they are seen to be disconcertingly inadequate. I am referring to the attempts to find an exact solution to the problems of social organization and to those pertaining to the moral sphere, as well as to their results, which stand out for their inadequacy and uselessness. The reductionist idea, that is, the principle according to which only the exact sciences have any dignity, and any other form of knowledge is worthy of respect only if it can be forced into the mould of the latter, is one of the gloomiest ideas of our age, and a guaranteed source of intellectual impoverishment.
One particularly significant example of the negative consequences to which the claim to be able to measure everything in objective terms can lead is given by the methods used for research "evaluation". Let us take the example of the socalled "Lombardi Program on Measuring University Performance" that is spreading through a number of US universities. It is based on nine indicators. Four of them are purely economic in nature: total and federal expenditure on the research, donations and fiscal grants. Two are honorary criteria: affiliation of staff members to academies and awards received. Three refer to "public success": number of doctorates and post doctorates and average values in admission tests.
Where do such criteria lead to when applied to research? In the first place, to the principle according to which the more funds you have the more you will be given. Those who have very few will have trouble breaking into the circuit. Moreover, anyone who has demonstrated Fermat's last theorem using pen and paper will get nothing, while those who have used costly computing resources will be rewarded. It matters not that these models (like those concerning the stock exchanges) are ineffective or lead to money being wasted. The quality of the research is in no way taken into consideration. In fact, it is not a quantifiable parameter. In the second place, the criterion of honorary awards penalizes a scientist who decides to work in a sector that is not considered fashionable: in the Europe hostile to relativity in the early 20th century, Einstein would have had a hard time. As far as the third group of criteria is concerned, I shall cite the example of an American lecturer who taught medieval European literature. He had only a few students and his post was precarious. As he loved cinema, he proposed running a course on the history of cinema. His students increased ten-fold and his academic and economic position improved out of sight. But a good medieval European literature course is no longer available in that university.
It might be objected that research is evaluated also on the basis of merit criteria, such as the socalled "impact factor", namely the prestige of the review in which a given article is published. But let me say that this is a unintelligent criterion. "Sur la dynamique de l’éléctron" by Henri Poincaré may be considered one of the most important scientific articles of last century. It was published in Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo, a tiny Sicilian review having a zero "impact factor" compared – shall we say – with Mathematische Annalen, but which became prestigious precisely because of the fact that many great scientists, out of sympathy for this initiative, published similar articles in it. Nevertheless a present-day "evaluator" would have been obliged to assign a low rating to the worthy Poincaré's article…
To return to the ethical sphere, it is particularly illusory and detrimental to consider that it can be reduced to the procedures of the exact sciences.
On the other hand, if we acknowledge that no limits may be imposed on science, it is not from science that we may expect to get ethical answers, other than that it is necessary to move forward in every case and in every possible way. Above all if the dominant paradigm is a reductionist one.
This is the origin of the misunderstanding over "ethics committees" by means of which it is attempted to solve problems regarding the social impact of science and technology, above all when the scientists sitting on such committees are assigned not only the role of transmitter of information, but also a special super partes role of "expert" in social and ethical questions. This sphere belongs to the citizens and the scientist and technologist can make rational statements only as citizen and "ethical subject".
I read in the presentation of this session that "DG Research has just launched the Science & Society action plan. It begins with the finding that European citizens are no longer prepared to accept that science and technology and its consequences are good for them. Citizens now want to participate in discussions on science issues that may influence their daily lives".
I find the second part
of the argument more convincing than the first.
If its citizens "are no
longer prepared to accept that science and technology and its consequences are
good for them", this is by no means necessarily the result of ignorance or
inadequate propagandizing of the virtues of science and technology. Should we
not rather ask ourselves whether the technoscience system is a source of
disappointment and justifiable concern for so many citizens, whether it fails to
respond - owing to its defects and not to the obtuseness of the "public" - to
their legitimate expectations? This brings to mind the words of the philosopher
Edmund Husserl written over half a century ago: "In the wretchedness of our life
– we hear – this science has nothing to say to us. It excludes on principle
precisely the most burning problems affecting man, who, in our harrowing times,
feels he is at the mercy of fate: the problems related to the meaning […] of
human existence as a whole. Do not these problems [...] demand, for all men, a
rationally grounded solution? They concern man in his behaviour to cope with the
world around him […] man who is free rationally to shape himself and the world
around him. What has science to tell us about reason […] about us men insofar as
we are subjects of this freedom? Obviously, the mere science of facts can tell
us nothing about this matter".
In other words, we must ask ourselves whether scientistic ideology is the right medicine to cure the ills afflicting our society and the anxieties troubling so many people. A good physician is not one who, when the patient's fever is rising, stubbornly prescribes increasing doses of aspirin for him but rather one who faces up to the problem of reappraising his diagnosis. I doubt whether increasing doses of scientism is a correct prescription for tranquillizing the anxious.
"Citizens now want to participate in discussions on science issues that may influence their daily lives". As citizens they have the same right to make ethical choices as scientists and technologists. I thus believe that one necessary step to be taken to counter the negative effects of scientistic reductionism is to reassert the principle that ethic questions have an autonomy of their own, even at the conceptual level, and that the problem of the practical impact of technoscience is the sole responsibility of the citizens insofar as they are political and ethical subjects. Another fundamental step forward consists in accepting that knowledge is a complex and multi-layered system, that cannot be reduced to unity under the banner of the exact sciences. It is a matter of acknowledging not only the fundamental role of the cognitive function – without which even technoscience runs the risk of becoming a shapeless medley of manipulations unsupported by any directive principles and run on a 'do-it-yourself' basis – but also that knowledge reflects the multiple aspects of reality, which often cannot be reduced to each other. Consequently, the exact and human sciences have equally important functions. There is no need to emphasize the consequences that all this has on research and cultural policies, and even on funding policy.
The lawmaker's task is to encourage the development of the science-technology system, above all protecting its more fragile part which is however also its driving force, namely basic research, even in its more speculative and cultural aspects. And to leave to society - and not to the "experts", let alone to the managers - the task of freely making the choices regarding those aspects in which the science-technology system interferes with the life and destiny of each of us.
Terrorism & Money & Power & Oil...
SAUDI ARABIA'S DUBIOUS DENIALS OF INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
by Dore Gold
JERUSALEM VIEWPOINTS No. 504 5 Tishrei 5764 / 1 October 2003
Saudi Arabia's past involvement in international terrorism is indisputable. While the Bush administration decided to redact 28 sensitive pages of the Joint Intelligence Report of the U.S. Congress, nonetheless, Saudi involvement in terrorist financing can be documented through materials captured by Israel in Palestinian headquarters in 2002-3. In light of this evidence, Saudi denials about terrorist funding don't hold water.
· Israel retrieved a document of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) which detailed the allocation of $280,000 to 14 Hamas charities. IIRO and other suspected global Saudi charities are not NGOs, since their boards of directors are headed by Saudi cabinet members. Prince Salman, a full brother of King Fahd, controls IIRO distributions "with an iron hand," according to former CIA operative Robert Baer. Mahmoud Abbas, in fact, complained, in a handwritten December 2000 letter to Salman, about Saudi funding of Hamas. Defense Minister Prince Sultan has been cited as a major IIRO contributor.
· It was hoped, after the May 12 triple bombing attack in Riyadh, that Saudi Arabia might halt its support for terrorism. Internally, the Saudi security forces moved against al-Qaeda cells all over the kingdom. But externally, the Saudis were still engaged in terrorist financing, underwriting 60-70 percent of the Hamas budget, in violation of their "roadmap" commitments to President Bush.
· Additionally, the Saudis back the civilian infrastructure of Hamas with extremist textbooks glorifying jihad and martyrdom that are used by schools and Islamic societies throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ideological infiltration of Palestinian society by the Saudis in this way is reminiscent of their involvement in the madrassa system of Pakistan during the 1980s, that gave birth to the Taliban and other pro bin-Laden groups.
Two years ago on September 11, 2001, most well-informed observers of the Middle East were shocked to hear that 15 out of the 19 hijackers who carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were Saudi citizens. It was equally surprising that the mastermind of the worst terrorist attack on the United States in its history, Osama bin Laden, was born and raised in Saudi Arabia. This curiosity and wonder about the Saudi role in the attack came up once more with the release of the September 11 Joint Intelligence Report by the U.S. Congress and its disclosure of what the U.S. press called "incontrovertible evidence" linking Saudis to the financing of al-Qaeda operatives in the United States.
For decades, terrorism had been associated with states like Libya, Syria, or Iran. Saudi Arabia had been a pro-Western force during the Cold War and had hosted large coalition armies during the 1991 Gulf War. Saudi Arabia had not been colonized during its history, like other Middle Eastern states that had endured a legacy of European imperialism. This background only sharpened the questions of many after the attacks: What was the precise source of the hatred that drove these men to take their own lives in an act of mass murder? The Saudis were initially in a state of denial about their connection to September 11; Interior Minister Prince Naif even tried to pin the blame for the attacks on Israel, saying it was impossible that Saudi youth could have been involved.1
Yet over time it became clearer how Saudi Arabia could have provided the ideological backdrop that spawned al-Qaeda's attack on the United States. In a series of articles appearing in the Egyptian weekly, Ruz al-Yousef (the Newsweek of Egypt), this past May, Wael al-Abrashi, the magazine's deputy editor, attempted to grapple with this issue. He drew a direct link between the rise of much of contemporary terrorism and Saudi Arabia's main Islamic creed, Wahhabism, and the financial involvement of Saudi Arabia's large charitable organizations:
Wahhabism leads, as we have seen, to the birth of extremist, closed, and fanatical streams, that accuse others of heresy, abolish them, and destroy them. The extremist religious groups have moved from the stage of Takfir [condemning other Muslims as unbelievers] to the stage of "annihilation and destruction," in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qa'ida - which Saudi authorities must admit is a local Saudi organization that drew other organizations into it, and not the other way around. All the organizations emerged from under the robe of Wahhabism.
I can state with certainly that after a very careful reading of all the documents and texts of the official investigations linked to all acts of terror that have taken place in Egypt, from the assassination of the late president Anwar Sadat in October 1981, up to the Luxor massacre in 1997, Saudi Arabia was the main station through which most of the Egyptian extremists passed, and emerged bearing with them terrorist thought regarding Takfir - thought that they drew from the sheikhs of Wahhabism. They also bore with them funds they received from the Saudi charities.2
Thus, while some Western commentators have sought to explain the roots of al-Qaeda's fury at the U.S. by focusing on the history of American policy in the Middle East or other external factors, a growing number of Middle Eastern analysts have concentrated instead on internal Saudi factors, including recent militant trends among Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi clerics and the role of large Saudi global charities in terrorist financing. This requires a careful look at how Saudi Arabia contributed to the ideological roots of some of the new wave of international terrorism as well as how the kingdom emerged as a critical factor in providing the resources needed by many terrorist groups.
The particular creed of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, which is known in the West as Wahhabism, emerged in the mid-eighteenth century in Central Arabia from the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. This Arabian religious reformer sought to rid Islam of foreign innovations that compromised its monotheistic foundations, and to restore what he believed were the religious practices of the seventh century at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors. He established a political covenant in 1744 with Muhammad bin Saud, the ruler of Diriyah near modern-day Riyadh, according to which he received bin Saud's protection and in exchange legitimized the spread of Saudi rule over a widening circle of Arabian tribes. This covenant between the Saudi royal family and Wahhabism is at the root of modern Saudi Arabia.
In retrospect, Wahhabism was significant for two reasons. First, it rejuvinated the idea of the militant jihad, or holy war, which had declined as a central Islamic value to be applied universally. Under the influence of Sufism, for example, jihad had also evolved into a more spiritual concept. Second, Wahhabism became associated with a brutal history of political expansion that led to the massacre of Muslims who did not adhere to its tenets, the most famous of which occurred against the Shi'ite Muslims of Kerbala in the early nineteenth century and against Sunni Muslims in Arabian cities, like Taif, during the early twentieth century. These Muslims were labeled as polytheists and thus did not deserve any protection. The highest spiritual authority of Islam during this period, the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, regarded the Wahhabis as heretics and waged wars against them in defense of Islam.
Yet it would be a mistake to focus on Wahhabism alone as the ideological fountainhead of the new global terrorism. Modern Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s hosted other militant movements that had an important impact, as well. For reasons of regional geopolitics, King Saud, King Faisal, and their successors provided sanctuary to elements of the radical Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Syria. Some were provided Saudi stipends. Others were given positions in the Saudi educational system, including the universities, or in the large Saudi charities, like the Muslim World League that was created in 1962. For example, while Egyptian President Abdul Nasser had the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Sayyed Qutb, executed in 1966, his brother, Muhammad Qutb, fled to Saudi Arabia and taught at King Abdul Aziz University in Jiddah. He was joined in the 1970s by one of the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood from Jordan, Abdullah Azzam. In 1979, both taught Osama bin Laden, a student at the university.
Saudi Arabia's global charities, like the Muslim World League, permitted the spread of the new militancy that was forged from the cooperation between the Wahhabi clerics and the Muslim Brotherhood refugees. After 1973, these charities benefited from the huge petrodollar resources dispensed by the Saudi government, which undoubtedly helped them achieve a global reach. Abdullah Azzam headed the offices of the Muslim World League in Peshawar, Pakistan, when it served as the rear base for the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He was joined by his student, bin Laden, who with Saudi funding also set up the Mujahidin Services Center (Maktab Khadmat al-Mujahidin) for Muslim volunteers who came to fight the Red Army. After Moscow's defeat in Afghanistan, this office became al-Qaeda.
Thus, the Saudi charities became the chosen instrument for Riyadh's support of the continuing global jihad.3 Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, ran the offices of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a Muslim World League offshoot, in the Philippines. Local intelligence agencies suspected that it served as a financial conduit to the Abu Sayyaf organization. Muhammad al-Zawahiri, brother of bin Laden's Egyptian partner, Ayman al-Zawahiri, would eventually work for IIRO in Albania. An IIRO employee from Bangladesh, Sayed Abu Nasir, led a cell broken up by Indian police that intended to strike at the U.S. consulates in Madras and Calcutta; Abu Nasir explained that his superiors told him of 40 to 50 percent of IIRO charitable funds being diverted to finance terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Kashmir.4 Summarizing this history, former CIA operative Robert Baer wrote: "When Saudi Arabia decided to fund the Afghan mujahidin in the early 1980s, the IIRO proved a perfect fit, a money conduit and plausible denial rolled into one."5
While these developments may seem far beyond the horizon of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a careful examination of some of the worst suicide bombings by the Hamas organization against the State of Israel also leads to Saudi Arabia. As of September 2003, Saudi clerics were featured prominently on Hamas websites as providing the religious justification for suicide bombings. Of 16 religious leaders cited by Hamas, Saudis are the largest national group backing these attacks.6 The formal Saudi position on suicide bombings, in fact, has been mixed. To his credit, the current Saudi Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al al-Sheikh, has condemned these acts. Yet at the same time, Saudi Arabia's Minister for Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Saleh Al al-Sheikh, has condoned them: "The suicide bombings are permitted...the victims are considered to have died a martyr's death."
The Hamas-Saudi connection should not come as a surprise. Hamas emerged in 1987 from the Gaza branch of Muslim Brotherhood which, as noted earlier, had become a key Saudi ally in previous decades. When Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was let out of an Israeli prison in 1998, he went to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment and Crown Prince Abdullah made a high-profile visit to his hospital bedside. As late as early 2002, Abdullah was hosting Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.7 Bin Laden had made the fate of Sheikh Yasin an issue for his al-Qaeda followers as well. In his 1996 "Declaration of War," he listed Sheikh Yasin's release from prison as one of his demands or grievances.
Saudi support for suicide bombings has wider repercussions. Other militant Islamic movements cite Saudi Wahhabi clerics to justify their activities - from the Chechen groups battling the Russians to Iraqi mujahidin fighting the U.S. in western Iraq.8 Coincidentally, the ubiquitous IIRO was lauded by the Saudi press for its support activities in the Sunni districts of post-Saddam Iraq, as well.9 Its presence was usually indicative in other regions of Saudi identification with local militant causes. In order to evaluate the significance of these religious rulings, it is necessary to focus on the stature of these various Saudi clerical figures that jihadi movements worldwide were citing.
For example, just after the September 11 attacks, it is true that many Saudi government officials condemned them. But there were other voices as well. Shortly thereafter a Saudi book appeared on the Internet justifying the murder of thousands of Americans, entitled The Foundations of the Legality of the Destruction That Befell America. The Introduction to the book was written by a prominent Saudi religious leader, Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaibi. He wrote on November 16, 2001, that he hoped Allah would bring further destruction upon the United States. Al-Shuaibi's name appears in a book entitled the Great Book of Fatwas, found in a Taliban office in Kabul. Sheikh al-Shuaibi appears on the Hamas website, noted earlier, as a religious source for suicide attacks. Attacks on U.S. soldiers in western Iraq by a Wahhabi group called al-Jama'a al-Salafiya were dedicated to his name and to the names of other Saudi clerics. Al-Shuaibi's ideas, in short, had global reach.
The question that must be asked is whether a religious leader of this sort is a peripheral figure on the fringes of society or whether he reflects more mainstream thinking. In fact, al-Shuaibi had very strong credentials. Born in 1925 in the Wahhabi stronghold of Buraida, he was a student of King Faisal's Grand Mufti, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al al-Sheikh. Al-Shuaibi's roster of students read like a "Who's Who" of Saudi Arabia, including the current Grand Mufti and the former Minister of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League secretary-general, Abdullah al-Turki. When al-Shuaibi died in 2002, many central Saudi figures attended his funeral. In short, he was mainstream. His militant ideas about justifying the September 11 attacks were echoed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman Jibrin, who actually was a member of the Directorate of Religious Research, Islamic Legal Rulings, and Islamic Propagation and Guidance - an official branch of the Saudi government.
In 2003, the religious opinions of Saudi militant clerics were turning up in Hamas educational institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For example, the Hamas-oriented "Koran and Sunna Society-Palestine," that had been established in 1996 in Kalkilya, had branches in Bethlehem, Salfit, Abu Dis, Jenin, and the Tulkarm area.10 It distributed Saudi texts praising suicide attacks against "the infidels" and condemning those who dodge their obligations to join "the jihad." The pro-Hamas "Dar al-Arqam Model School" in Gaza, that was established with Saudi aid, used texts that cited Sheikh Sulaiman bin Nasser al-Ulwan, a pro-al-Qaeda Saudi cleric, whose name is mentioned in a bin Laden video clip from December 2001. Both the "Koran and Sunna Society-Palestine" and the "Dar al-Arqam Model School" were supported by the Saudi-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) (see below), and were part of the "civilian" infrastructure of Hamas. Militant Saudi texts extolling martyrdom were infiltrated into schools throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, creating a whole generation of students that absorbed their extremist messages. The export of this jihadi ideology to the Palestinians was reminiscent of the Saudi support for madrasses in western Pakistan during the 1980s, that gave birth to the Taliban and other pro-bin Laden groups.
As already demonstrated, Saudi Arabia erected a number of large global charities in the 1960s and 1970s whose original purpose may have been to spread Wahhabi Islam, but which became penetrated by prominent individuals from al-Qaeda's global jihadi network. The three most prominent of these charities were the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO; an offshoot of the Muslim World League), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Charitable Foundations of al-Haramain. All three are suspected by various global intelligence organizations of terrorist funding. From the CIA's interrogation of an al-Qaeda operative, it was learned that al-Haramain, for example, was used as a conduit for funding al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Russia's Federal Security Service charged that al-Haramain was wiring funds to Chechen militants in 1999.11
It would be incorrect to view these charities as purely non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private charities, as they are mistakenly called. At the apex of each organization's board is a top Saudi official. The Saudi Grand Mufti, who is also a Saudi cabinet member, chairs the Constituent Council of the Muslim World League. The Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs chairs the secretariat of WAMY and the administrative council of al-Haramain. All three organizations have received large charitable contributions from the Saudi royal family that have been detailed in Saudi periodicals. Indeed, according to legal documents submitted on behalf of the Saudis by their legal team in the firm Baker Botts, in the 9/11 lawsuit, Prince Sultan provided $266,000 a year to the IIRO for sixteen years.12 He also provided a much smaller sum to WAMY. In short, these Saudi charities were full-fledged GOs - governmental organizations.
The earliest documented links between one of these charities and terrorists was found in Bosnia. It is a handwritten account on IIRO stationery from the late 1980s of a meeting attended by the secretary-general of the Muslim World League and bin Laden representatives, indicating the IIRO's readiness to have its offices used in support of militant actions.13 As already noted, IIRO has been suspected of terrorist funding in the Philippines, Russia, East Africa, Bosnia, and India. Al-Qaeda operatives became accustomed to Saudi Arabia being their source of support, in general. In an intercepted telephone conversation, a senior al-Qaeda operative told a subordinate: "Don't ever worry about money, because Saudi Arabia's money is your money."14 As recently as mid-August 2003, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage admitted in Australia that "some money from Saudi private charities had gone toward funding militants in Iraq."15
But the strongest documented cases that demonstrate the ties between Saudi Arabia's global charities and international terrorism are related to Hamas. These ties were allegedly already in place in the mid-1990s when a Hamas funding group received instructions to write letters of thanks to executives of IIRO and WAMY for funds it had received. In 1994, President Clinton made a brief stop-over in Saudi Arabia during which he complained about Saudi funding of Hamas. These charges about Saudi Arabia bankrolling Hamas have become even more vociferous in recent years.
The Saudis have been equally vociferous in their denials. Crown Prince Abdullah's foreign policy advisor, Adel al-Jubeir, asserted on CNN's "Crossfire" on August 16, 2002: "We do not allow funding to go from Saudi Arabia to Hamas." More recently, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal told the Saudi daily Arab News on June 23, 2003, that since the establishment of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Saudi Kingdom only sends funding through the PLO. He denied that the Saudis finance Hamas.
Yet during Israel's Operation Defensive Shield last year, a whole array of documents was uncovered which show these repeated Saudi denials to be completely baseless. One of the strongest pieces of evidence came from a handwritten letter written in Arabic by the former Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), on December 30, 2000, to Prince Salman, governor of Riyadh and a full brother of King Fahd. Abbas complained that Saudi donations in the Gaza Strip are going to an organization called al-Jamiya al-Islamiya (the Islamic Society) which, Abbas explained, "belongs to Hamas." He wanted the funds for Fatah.
Al-Jamiya al-Islamiya was not just a Hamas front, supporting positive social programs and secretly diverting funds to military activity. Even its showcase "humanitarian" activities were reprehensible. For example, at a kindergarten graduation involving some of its 1,600 Palestinian pre-schoolers, children wore uniforms and carried mock rifles. Others re-enacted the lynching of Israelis or other terrorist attacks. A five-year-old girl dipped her hands in what was supposed to be Israeli blood and then lifted them for the cameras. Al-Jamiya al-Islamiya posted the photographs on its website. Thus, the Saudis were not only funding the current generation of terrorism but also the next generation as well.
There were other documents linking Saudi institutions to terrorist financing. An actual IIRO document was found that detailed how $280,000 was to be allocated to 14 Hamas front groups. Former CIA operative Robert Baer has contended that the very same Prince Salman, who received Mahmoud Abbas's letter of complaint, controlled IIRO distributions "with an iron hand."16 There was further evidence tying the Saudis to Hamas. Checks made out to well-known Hamas fronts from the corporate account of al-Rajhi Banking and Investment at Chase Manhattan Bank were also uncovered. Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment was one of the largest Saudi banking networks which serviced the Saudi charities. Its head, Sulaiman al-Rajhi, headed the family that established the SAAR (the acronym for his name) foundation in Herndon, Virginia, which was raided last year by U.S. federal agents because of suspected terrorist links.
The Saudis were clearly uncomfortable with the Israeli discoveries. Adel al-Jubeir tried to question the authenticity of the documents. Alternatively, he attempted to misrepresent their content. Thus, on the BBC interview program "Hardtalk" with Tim Sebastian on August 15, 2003, al-Jubeir argued that Mahmoud Abbas's letter to Prince Salman, noted above, contained no reference to Hamas, but only to undefined Islamic groups.17 Yet, in fact, Abbas made explicit reference to Hamas as a recipient of Saudi aid, in his own handwriting.
There were other conduits for terrorist funding that were disclosed. Spreadsheets from the Saudi Committee for Aid to the al-Quds Intifada were found that detailed the movement of moneys to the families of suicide bombers. Saudi spokesmen tried to distance themselves from this activity by arguing that they helped these families through "international aid organizations." Yet it became clear from the spreadsheets that these contributions were given through a specifically Saudi organization, headed by the Saudi Minister of the Interior, Prince Naif. Indeed, at the top right-hand corner of the spreadsheets found in the West Bank, the name "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" stands out. In the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, this kind of support "incentivized" the suicide terrorist attacks.
The Hamas case demonstrated the mode of operation of Saudi charities in support of terrorism. It was significant, as well, for those investigating other cases of global terrorism, including al-Qaeda, since very often these groups shared the same funding mechanisms. IIRO and BMI, a New Jersey-based Islamic investment bank, were involved in Hamas funding and are suspected to have financed the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in East Africa.18 As a case-study, Hamas's funding is particularly useful to examine, since it is the best-documented case of how the Saudis used their charities to back militant activities.
Most of the documents discovered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were dated from the year 2000. Saudi diplomats argued that after September 11, 2001, they had turned over a new leaf. For example, in December 2002, the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington released a nine-page report detailing the steps they had taken to keep better track of what the charities were doing. The Saudi report stated that since September 11, 2001, "charitable groups have been closely monitored and additional audits have been performed to assure that there are no links to suspected groups." Were this indeed the new Saudi policy, it made sense, since President Bush had clearly stated that in the war on terrorism, states were "either with us or with the terrorists."
Yet just weeks before the newest Saudi assurances were provided on terrorist financing at a news conference in Washington, one of the top leaders of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, had been invited to Riyadh for a WAMY conference. So while in Washington the press corps was told that there were no longer any ties between the Saudi charities and "suspected groups," in Riyadh, one of the three main Saudi charities was hosting the leader of one of the "suspected groups," Hamas, that had been labeled by the U.S. government as an international terrorist organization. According to a captured Hamas document that detailed Khaled Mashal's visit to Saudi Arabia, he actually had been invited by Crown Prince Abdullah himself. While Hamas had refused at the time to stop its suicide attacks, nonetheless, Saudi officials reassured Mashal of continuing support.
These discrepancies between Saudi declarations and realities on the ground have been found elsewhere. In a June 12, 2003, news conference in Washington, Adel al-Jubeir announced that al-Haramain "would be shutting down all of its foreign offices."19 Yet on July 5, 2003, Jane Perlez reported in the New York Times from Jakarta, Indonesia, that al-Haramain put its large headquarters in a Jakarta suburb up for rent and simply "moved to a smaller house down the block."20 In another case, the al-Haramain office in Ashland, Oregon, was still up and running in September 2003, though its lawyer argued it did not receive funds from its main office in Riyadh.21
A new context for the issue of Saudi funding of terrorist groups was created when President Bush issued the "Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" on April 30, 2003. Besides requiring difficult measures by Israelis and Palestinians alike, the first phase of the new Bush administration plan specifically called on Arab states to "cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror." In short, Saudi Arabia had to come under the roadmap, as well. Meeting the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain at Sharm el-Sheikh on June 3, 2003, President Bush announced that they had committed themselves to use all means to cut off assistance to any terror group.
It might have been expected that Saudi Arabia would adhere to this firm U.S. policy and not defy President Bush. After all, Crown Prince Abdullah had made a commitment to President Bush at Sharm el-Sheikh. Moreover, on May 12, 2003, Saudi Arabia itself was struck by a triple suicide bombing that led to 35 fatalities, including 9 Americans. Having denied that there was an al-Qaeda presence in the Saudi kingdom, the Saudi government began uncovering al-Qaeda cells and munitions in Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, Jiddah, and in the northern al-Jawf area. After providing the ideological and financial basis for the growth of al-Qaeda and its sister organizations, including Hamas, the Saudis found that the fire they had ignited was coming back to burn them as well.
Unfortunately, while the Saudis appear to be taking their own domestic threat seriously, there is no indication that they have scaled back terrorism financing abroad. For example, on June 26, 2003, David Aufhauser, the General Counsel to the Treasury Department, appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee and still described Saudi Arabia as "the epicenter" of terrorist financing. That was more than a month after the Riyadh bombings. More than two months after the bombing, on July 31, 2003, John Pistole, the Acting FBI Director for Counterterrorism, was asked about Saudi efforts to stop terrorist financing. Pistole, who praised the level of Saudi cooperation with the FBI on investigating the Riyadh bombings as "unprecedented," could only say with respect to Saudi moves against terrorist financing, "the jury's still out."
This has been borne out by the Israeli experience with Hamas. The Israeli national assessment is that Saudi Arabia today funds more than 50 percent of the needs of Hamas, and the Saudi percentage in the total foreign aid to Hamas is actually growing. U.S. law enforcement officials agree.22 Some Israeli estimates of the Saudi portion of the Hamas budget have been put at 60-70 percent.23 Saudi Arabia continues to aid the families of suicide bombers. It helps dual-use charities and charities that funnel funds directly to military activities against Israel. Indeed, in August 2003, the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, thanked IIRO and WAMY for their assistance during a public address in the Gaza Strip.
On June 29, 2003, Hamas agreed to a temporary truce with Israel called a hudna, but at the same time vigorously sought to rebuild its operational infrastructure, including an effort to increase the quantity and quality of Qassam rockets launched against Israelis towns. Muslim writers have argued in the past that a hudna is to be maintained until the balance of power improves for the Muslim side. Funding Hamas clearly jeopardized efforts to reach a full-scale cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians and increased the likelihood that Hamas would escalate its militant actions. By August 28, 2003, Hamas was able to launch one of its new extended-range Qassam rockets, developed during the hudna, a distance of nearly six miles, striking the outskirts of Ashkelon. The hudna had already collapsed.
There was one exception to these disturbing trends. On August 18, 2003, the Saudi government adopted its first money-laundering law, which, in theory, could be used to block terrorist financing. The law contained steep fines and long jail terms for violators. But it was too early to determine whether the law would be enforced or would just remain on the books. In the past, Saudi counter-terrorist initiatives proved to be mostly empty rhetoric. U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow praise the Saudi decision to clamp down on terrorist financing during a visit to Jiddah on September 17, 2003, yet there was little evidence to indicate that this was any more than an attempt to acknowledge Saudi intentions in the absence of any tangible results.
Very simply, past Saudi commitments to take effective measures against terrorist financing or incitement to violence have been half-hearted, at best. At a June 12, 2003, news conference, Adel al-Jubeir announced with great fanfare that Saudi Arabia had fired several hundred clerics and suspended more than a thousand for preaching intolerance.24 Yet within weeks, the Saudi deputy minister for Islamic affairs flatly denied that the move against the clerics had anything to do with curbing extremism. Whatever the reason why the clerics were disciplined, the Saudi governmental message to the mosques has not been sufficiently clear: U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan noted: "We have noticed lately in influential mosques the imam has condemned terrorism and preached in favor of tolerance, then closed the sermon with 'O God, please destroy the Jews, the infidels, and all who support them.'"25 In short, all dimensions of the supposed Saudi war on terrorism look incomplete.
The Saudis have faced domestic terrorism before. It is instructive to recall that in 1995, Saudi Arabia's National Guard headquarters was struck by pro-bin Laden forces. Yet, domestic threats in the mid-1990s did not cause the Saudis to halt their assistance to jihadi groups abroad, like Hamas or the Taliban. Riyadh appears able to draw a distinction between acts of domestic subversion and international terrorist activities, which are seen as part of the global jihad. Saudi spokesmen frequently ask how they could support an organization that intended to harm them. Yet that it is the essence of the "Faustian bargain" (to borrow an expression from former CIA director James Woolsey) that they apparently struck in the 1990s: al-Qaeda could strike globally and the Saudis would pay them to leave the royal family alone.
This analysis was intended to disclose the critical role of Saudi Arabia in providing ideological and financial support for the new terrorism. While most of the evidence presented here comes from the specific case of Hamas, the modus operandi adopted in the Hamas case is probably applicable to other parts of the global terrorist network as well. This is especially true of the critical role of Saudi Arabia's global charities in sustaining many similar militant organizations from Indonesia to central Russia. While Saudi spokesmen have provided repeated assurances that they have cleaned up these activities, their denials with respect to terrorist funding do not stand up against the documented evidence that has accumulated in the last two years.
The Saudi government faces hard dilemmas. It has recently taken disciplinary action against some of its most extreme religious leaders. But traditionally, the Saudis need the backing of their clerics to legitimize their regime; that is the heart of the Saudi-Wahhabi covenant that dates back to the eighteenth century. Yet the Saudis also need the ultimate protective shield provided by the United States. In order to sustain this, they have spent huge sums of money for public relations firms and influence-brokers. But the time has come to tell the Saudis that they have to make a choice. After September 11, there has to be zero tolerance for terrorist funding and other forms of terrorist support.
The stakes involved are not just a question of public relations or Arab-Israel point-scoring in Washington. The West needs to come to an understanding with the Islamic world based on mutual respect and tolerance. The radicalization of the Middle East being promoted by the Saudis undermines that goal and threatens to substitute instead a vision of perpetual militancy and conflict. For that reason, what is at stake is nothing less than the security of the United States and its allies, as well as the question of whether the Middle East moves in the direction of hope and peace or relapses into a state of continuing strife.
* * *
Saudi National Charities and the
Financing of International
Terrorism
|
IIRO -
International Islamic Relief Organization |
WAMY - |
Charitable Foundations
of |
|
Headed by Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al
al-Sheikh |
Headed by Sheikh Saleh bin Abdul Aziz Al
al-Sheikh |
Headed by Sheikh Saleh bin Abdul Aziz Al
al-Sheikh |
|
Receives Donations from |
Receives Donations from |
Receives Donations from |
|
GLOBAL LINKS TO TERRORISM | ||
|
Documented link to Osama bin Laden in 1989, when al-Qaeda founded, on IIRO stationery |
U.S. WAMY office in Northern Virginia under investigation (past director, Abdullah bin Laden) |
Finances al-Qaeda operations in Southeast Asia |
|
Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, runs Philippines offices - conduit to Abu Sayyaf |
WAMY-Hamas connection noted in 1996 |
al-Haramain closed down by Bosnian government for "financing the activities of terrorist organizations" |
|
Muhammad al-Zawahiri, brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri (#2 in al-Qaeda), employed in Albanian office |
WAMY funds I'tilaf al-Khir of Sheikh Qaradhawi which directs money to Hamas |
Azerbaijan closes down al-Haramain for Chechen terrorist activities |
|
Kenya blacklists IIRO |
WAMY hosts Hamas, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, November 2002 |
al-Haramain employees arrested in Albania |
|
IIRO employee implicated in planned terrorist attack in India |
al-Haramain closed down in Somalia | |
|
IIRO in Pankisi Gorge (Georgia) conduit to al-Ansar in Chechnya |
||
|
Documented IIRO funding of Hamas, on IIRO stationery |
||
* * *
Notes
1. Middle East Media Research Institute, Special
Dispatch Series - No. 446 - Saudi Arabia, December 3, 2002.
2. Middle East
Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series - No. 526 - Saudi Arabia,
June 20, 2003.
3. Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington
Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude (New York: Crown Books, 2003), p. 141.
4.
Steven Emerson with Jonathan Levin, "Terrorism Financing: Origination,
Organization, and Prevention: Saudi Arabia, Terrorist Financing and the War on
Terror," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
July 31, 2003.
5. Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, p. 141.
6.
http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/fatawa/index.htm.
7. Ain
al-Yaqeen, February 1, 2002.
8. Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi, "Who is
Taking Credit for Attacks on the U.S. Army in Western Iraq? Al-Jama'a
al-Salafiya al-Mujahida," Jerusalem Issue Brief 3-3, August 5, 2003;
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-3.htm.
9. Stephen Schwartz, "Saudi Mischief
in Fallujah," Weekly Standard, June 23, 2003.
10.
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/var/h_sch/hs_fl.htm.
11. Sharon
LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya," Washington Post, April
26, 2003.
12. Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "A Legal Counterattack,"
Newsweek, April 16, 2003; http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/901320.asp.
13.
Glenn Simpson, "List of Early al-Qaeda Donors Points to Saudi Elite," Wall
Street Journal, March 18, 2003.
14. Sebastian Rotella, "A Road to Ansar
Began in Italy," Los Angeles Times, April 28, 2003, as cited by Matthew
A. Levitt, testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Senate Judiciary
Committee, September 10, 2003.
15. The Australian, August 14,
2003.
16. Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, p. 167.
17. "Have the
Saudis Learned Their Lessons?" BBC News, August 15, 2003;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/3153801.stm.
18. Matthew
Epstein and Ben Schmidt, "Operation Support-System Shutdown," National
Review, September 4, 2003.
19.
http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/statements/03-ST-Adel-embassy-0612-transcript.htm.
June 12, 2003.
20. Jane Perlez, "Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in
Indonesia," New York Times, July 5, 2003.
21. Steve Miller, "Oregon
Group Thrives Despite al-Qaeda Tie," Washington Times, September 15,
2003.
22. Don Van Natta, Jr. with Timothy L. O'Brien, "Flow of Saudis' Cash
to Hamas is Scrutinized," New York Times, September 17, 2003.
23.
Arieh O'Sullivan, "Israeli Intelligence Officials Dismiss Abbas's Denial of
Saudi Aid to Terrorists," Jerusalem Post, August 11, 2003. A "senior
security official" was reported to have stated that the amount was 70 percent.
Ha'aretz, July 29, 2003.
24. James Dao, "Saudis Fire Clerics Who
Preached Intolerance," New York Times, June 13, 2003.
25. Lisa Beyer,
"Inside the Kingdom," Time, September 15, 2003.
* * *
Dore Gold is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations (1997-1999). He is the author of Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003). This Jerusalem Viewpoints is an updated version of his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs of July 31, 2003, and is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem on September 18, 2003.
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The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs mourns the passing of JCPA Fellow Professor Emil Fackenheim Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto |
Lettere alla direzione
Vita quotidiana in Israele
Io sono un morto che cammina. Da 8 anni vivo in Israele, ed è come partecipare quotidianamente ad una roulette russa. Sono appena scampato per la quinta volta in 7 anni a un attentato organizzato da terroristi palestinesi contro civili israeliani. Nell'ottobre del 1994 ero in Rehov Dizengoff a Tel Aviv per conoscere i genitori della mia futura moglie quando 80 metri alle mie spalle un terrorista suicida si faceva esplodere dentro un autobus uccidendo 22 passeggeri. Gli europei, allora, ci dissero: "State calmi, questo è il prezzo che bisogna pagare per la pace". Riuscii a conoscere i miei futuri suoceri, e due anni dopo, attraversai Shderot Ben Gurion pochi minuti prima che un terrorista suicida si immolasse in un bar portando con se un neonato e la fidanzata di un mio amico. Con i primi soldi guadagnati il morto che cammina si compra macchina e bicicletta ed evita gli autobus che vengono fatti esplodere a Ramat Gan e Gerusalemme (oltre 100 morti in pochi giorni).Arafat aveva bisogno in quel frangente di qualche strage per fare pressioni sui negoziatori israeliani, continuavamo a sentire rassicurazioni di americani ed europei sul prezzo da pagare per la pace e la gente continuava a saltare in aria. Con un abile gioco degli specchi Arafat faceva il paladino della pace quando in visita a Gaza o Ramallah si presentavano ministri europei, mentre ogni sera in tv sentivo gli incitamenti in arabo alla lotta armata e durante una visita in una moschea a Citta' del Capo metteva in chiaro che gli accordi firmati con Izchak Rabin rientravano nel vecchio piano per fasi dell'OLP volto alla distruzione di Israele (otteniamo una base territoriale a qualsiasi prezzo dalla quale poi sferrare l'offensiva e buttare in mare tutti gli ebrei). La sinistra israeliana si faceva bella in Europa perche' continuava a riconoscere Arafat come valido interlocutore mentre Netaniahu era il "falco" perche' si impuntava che l'OLP parecchi anni dopo la firma di Oslo non aveva ancora cancellato ufficialmente la clausola che chiamava alla distruzione di Israele. All¹epoca, nei viaggi a Milano tutti i conoscenti mi facevano i complimenti per la pace con i palestinesi e io, senza essere troppo ascoltato, cercavo di spiegare che Arafat ci aveva distillato oltre 600 morti in 5 anni e che i bambini a Gaza e Cisgiordania già all'eta' di 5 anni sono addestrati al martirio e all'uso del kalashnikov. Anziché cercare di far crescere una generazione nuova educata al dialogo ed al rispetto per l'ex nemico, Arafat usa i fondi della UE per stampare testi che incitano alla guerra santa islamica, che descrivono gli ebrei come scimmie, negano l'olocausto e nelle loro cartine geografiche non riportano neanche l'esistenza di un paese chiamato Israele. Ogni tanto il mio amico Abu Ala di Gaza, veniva a casa per effettuare delle piccole riparazioni e tra una sigaretta e un caffè mi spiegava che gli scagnozzi di Arafat girano per la citta' su Mercedes nere, si arricchiscono con il contrabbando, e sono disprezzati dalla popolazione che vive nel terrore. Gli chiedevo se avesse avuto accesso ai 20 milioni di Euro dell'UE destinati alla costruzione di case popolari e lui sogghignando mi parlava di ville faraoniche per i colonnelli dell'OLP che crescevano come funghi sulle coste di Gaza. Non scherzavo quando gli dicevo che se la leadership palestinese fosse stata come lui, la pace, quella vera, l'avremmoavuta da tempo. Dopo il rifiuto di Arafat a Barak (3,7 milioni di palestinesi dovrebbero secondo Arafat entrare nei confini di Israele) ho assistito al linciaggio di 2 soldati israeliani a Ramallah filmato da una troupe di Mediaset mentre il corrispondente della RAI in Israele si scusava con Arafat in persona che un suo connazionale avesse filmato un episodio che avrebbe potuto scalfire l'immagine palestinese in Europa. Amici israeliani mi chiedevano delucidazioni ed io diventavo rosso di vergogna. Quando i palestinesi accusati di collaborare con Israele vengono fucilati senza processo, e i loro cadaveri incaprettati fatti sfilare per la città e poi appesi sulla piazza principale per essere poi ferocemente colpiti dalla folla esaltata, la stampa italiana pubblica brevi trafiletti. Ovviamente nessuna condanna è mai venuta dalle autorita' cristiane in Terrasanta, appiattite sulle posizioni di Arafat. Li capisco, fanno il loro lavoro in un ambiente difficilissimo dove se dici una parola fuori posto contro il Rais puoi dire addio al mondo terreno. I giornalisti italiani però potrebbero parlare. Ho letto centinaia di articoli intrisi di menzogne ai danni di Israele che riportano interviste a personalità palestinesi. Non ho mai letto un articolo che parli della situazione di terrore in cui vivono gli arabi cristiani intimiditi e minacciati quotidianamente dall'arroganza dei fondamentalisti islamici. Queste cose io le sento invece ogni giorno da amici arabi cristiani di Nazareth, i quali temono per la loro incolumità fisica e intendono lasciare il Paese al più presto. Dopo che un gruppo di terroristi dei Tanzim ha assaltato la Chiesa della Natività a Betlemme si arriva al grottesco quando il custode di Terrasanta Padre Jager parla amichevolmente al TG israeliano e 30 minuti dopo su Canale 5 inveisce contro Israele. La ragion di stato ancora una volta prevale sulla verità. Marzo 2002. Rinchiuso ermeticamente in casa con moglie e prole a causa degli attentati, sono comunque costretto a fare la spesa. Vado a comprare la pasta Barilla in un supermercato di Herzlia. Scelta fortunata. Esattamente nel momento in cui entro nel supermercato, sento dell'attentato al supermercato di Gerusalemme. A casa ascolto Romano Prodi chiedere ad Arafat di "far di più per bloccare i terroristi", in modo da tornare ai colloqui di pace. Nessuno ha spiegato al Professore che i terroristi che rivendicano le stragi di civili sono i Tanzim e le brigate di Al Akza gruppi controllati da Arafat ? Veramente Prodi crede che un accordo con Arafat valga più del pezzo di carta sul quale è scritto ? Mentre mangio un trancio di pizza apprendo che 15 israeliani (fra cui alcuni arabi) sono stati dilaniati in un ristorante di Haifa da un inviato di Arafat. La pizza va di traverso, i resti irriconoscibili dei morti sono seppelliti e ci prepariamo alla cena del Seder di Pasqua. Prendo la macchina e sfido il destino. Andiamo a Raanana, 5 minuti dal confine con Arafatlandia. Danielino, il mio bambino di 2 anni, è a un solo posto di blocco dai terroristi palestinesi (il posto di blocco che per Kofi Annan "umilia i palestinesi"). Alle 19 la funzione finisce, comincia a piovigginare, la gente si accalca all'uscita, ma esita ad uscire per timore di bagnarsi. Se un terrorista avesse potuto colpire, avrebbe fatto un colpo da 50 morti. Il terrorista esattamente alla stessa ora sceglie Natanya, a 7 minuti di distanza. Ne fa fuori 28 tra cui parecchi reduci dei campi di sterminio. Mi chiedo se la novantenne trucidata a Natanya avesse conosciuto ad Auschwitz mio nonno e il mio bisnonno che li' finirono gasati. Camere a gas? Giusto, dimenticavo. Corro a ritirare la maschera antigas misura extrasmall per mio figlio. Saddam Hussein, riconoscente per l'appoggio continuo di Arafat foraggia il terrorismo palestinese con 25,000 dollari di premio a ogni famiglia di kamikaze e potrebbe mantenere le minacce che sentiamo con regolarità settimanale di sparare su Tel Aviv missili batteriologici (prodotti con tecnologia europea). Finora sono stato fortunato ma devo scrivere la mia esperienza di morto che cammina ora, senza indugi. Se non ora quando? Non so se la prossima volta la fortuna mi assisterà. Se mi andasse male, vi prego di non chiamarmi "vittima della pace", non dite che sono "morto per mano di un militante palestinese", non intervistate il ministro della propaganda palestinese il quale dirà che il terrorista che mi ha ucciso voleva "vendicare la ritorsione israeliana del giorno prima. Dite solo che un ebreo italiano è stato ucciso a sangue freddo da terroristi palestinesi inviati da Yasser Arafat. Chiedo solo un gesto di pietà. Non fate leggere a mia madre un articolo nel quale Romano Prodi annuncia sanzioni dell'UE contro "Israele perché rifiuta con arroganza di trattare con Arafat". Sarebbe il colpo della staffa.
Marcello Del Monte (Tel Aviv)
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